In a deregulated electricity market such as the California WEPEX, spinning reserves must be explicitly identi ed as an ancillary service and priced. Additionally, scheduling coordinators who match suppliers and demands may either self-provide spinning reserves, or rely on the Independent System Operator ISO to provide reserves at the spot price. The deregulated market structure makes explicit the implicit softness that has always been recognized in the reserve constraints: additional reserves may h a ve v alue even when a minimum reserve requirement has been met. In this paper we formulate the spinning reserve requirement SRR as a function of the endogenously determined marginal values of reserves. The spinning reserve requirement depends, according to a nonincreasing response function, on a price value signal. We present three power system scheduling algorithms in which this price value signal is updated at each iteration of a dual optimization. Game theory is used to interpret the proposed algorithms. Numerical test results are also presented.
Introduction
The solution of power system scheduling problems is essential to a power utility like PG&E for major unit commitment and transaction decisions. relaxation methods are now widely used approaches to solve unit commitment 2 , 4 , 7 . At PG&E, the Hydro-Thermal Optimization HTO program was developed almost a decade ago based on the Lagrangian relaxation approach 4 . In our recent w orks, the Lagrangian relaxation-based algorithm has been extended to schedule thermal units under ramp rate constraints 11 and transmission constraints 14 .
The objective of the unit commitment is to minimize the total generating costs of the power system over the planning horizon subject to system constraints e.g. load balance constraints and spinning reserve constraints and unit constraints e.g. minimum up down time constraints and ramp constraints. Most of the unit constraints describe the physical limits of generation units and should not be violated.
In contrast to these`hard' constraints, the spinning reserve constraints are`soft,' both in the sense that they do not represent actual physical limits normally they are determined by regulation or law, and in the sense that there may b e v alue-added in exceeding the set level. A deregulated electricity market structure makes explicit the implicit softness that has always been recognized in the reserve constraints. In the deregulated electricity market proposed in California, spinning reserve has been explicitly identi ed as an ancillary service that will be priced. Additionally, coordinators who match suppliers and demands in California, for example, the Power Exchange which will initially be responsible for matching most current utility-owned generation and load may either self-provide spinning reserves or rely on the independent system operator ISO, who conducts an auction to provide a spot price for reserves.
The softness of the reserve constraints has previously been dealt with using fuzzy logic techniques 6 . In 6 , Guan et al. proposed an e cient fuzzy optimization-based method to solve the unit commitment problem with soft reserve requirements. They rst convert the problem to a`crisp' one, then take advantage of separability of the problem and solve i t b y Lagrangian relaxation. They also show the trade-o between cost-minimization and system reserve satisfaction. However, to avoid infeasibility, the aspiration level of the generation cost is obtained by running the crisp problem with the lowest acceptable reserve requirement. This requires multiple runs of the unit commitment algorithm.
Hourly spinning reserve requirements are usually de ned to be the greater of a xed percentage of total forecast demand and the largest on-line unit. A utility or scheduling coordinator may h o wever wish to increase the SRR to a higher level, provided the additional reserves do not cost too much. In this situation, the unit commitment program as usually formulated would probably rst be run with the higher SRR. If the marginal cost of reserves at that level were too high, or no feasible commitment satisfying the requirement could be found, the operator would run the program again with a lower requirement, though still greater than or equal to the minimum reserve requirement de ned by statute or scheduling protocol. Such a trial and error approach requires multiple runs of the unit commitment program and is time-consuming.
In this paper, we propose a new approach e m bedded in the Lagrangian relaxation approach. The SRR is de ned as adaptive and adjustable between two levels of reserve requirement in all hours. The SRR is adjusted based on the corresponding Lagrange multiplier, which is viewed as price information. Game theory is used to interpret our proposed algorithms. The method proposed in this paper does not require the multiple runs of unit commitment required by other approaches.
We present a formulation of the thermal unit commitment problem in Section 2. In Section 3 after a brief review of the Lagrangian relaxation formulation, we i n terpret this formulation by a t wo-rm model, from which the adaptive price-based SRR is derived. A three-phase algorithm is then presented in Section 4 to solve the unit commitment problem with the adaptive SRR. Numerical test results and conclusions are given in Sections 5 and 6.
Problem formulation
In this paper the following standard notation will be used. Additional symbols will be introduced when necessary.
i : index for the number of units i = 1 ; ; I t : index for time t = 0 ; ; T 3.1 Two-rm model with xed SRR Each unit subproblem d i can be interpreted as a pro t maximization problem for unit i 9, 1 0 , where unit i is an endogenously priced resource and t and t are the prices paid to the resource.
We i n terpret the dual optimization using the following two-rm model: Firm P, a p o wer utility, facing demand D t needs to purchase fuel from rm Q for generation. Fuel for di erent generating units may v ary and fuel cost is described by C i . Firm Q also sells power and spinning reserves. It o ers rm P the prices t and t for power and spinning reserves at hour t respectively. Firm P's objective is to minimize its total cost given two options: buy fuel and self-generate or directly buy power from rm Q. Firm Q's problem is to adjust the prices of t and t so as to achieve its maximum revenue, considering that customer rm P will minimize its cost. Remarks:
1. In Figure 1 the dual objective function is divided into two optimization problems of two rms. If rm P decides to purchase fuel, its spending is captured by the two terms in the rst bracket in the objective function. If rm P purchases either power or spinning capacity from rm Q, it pays the corresponding amounts in the second bracket. No matter what option rm P chooses, rm Q collects the money. From rm Q's perspective i f D t , P I i=1 p k it u k it 0 there is an excess demand for power, and rm Q could raise the price. 3. Raising t would stimulate the system to increase total generation at hour t and vice versa. Increasing t would at some point make more units turn on. Changing either t or t would a ect spinning reserve, but it can be shown that the amount of spinning reserve only depends on t , t .
This two-rm model can be treated as a 2-player game. Consider a sequential bargaining game of complete and perfect information in which rm Q player 1 moves rst and decides prices t and t t = 1 ; ; T ; rm P player 2 observes t and t t = 1 ; ; T , and then chooses its optimal generating policy, u it ; x it ; p it , 8i; t. W e have the following proposition. Proposition 1 If ; ; u ; p is the solution to D, it is a Nash equilibrium 5 of the above game.
Proof. The solution to D is a Nash equilibrium because given the other player's strategy, each player has no incentive to deviate: given rm P's strategy u ; p , rm Q has no incentive to deviate from ; , since these prices maximize its revenue d which is a concave function. Similarly, given rm Q's strategy ; , u ; p i s the best strategy for rm P, since u ; p minimizes d ; .
Note that the result of Proposition 1 holds if the game is a simultaneous-move game. However, a sequential game with no need to assume that rm P, a spinning reserve provider, has market power ts reality better than the model of a simultaneousmove game. The subgradient algorithm therefore can be regarded as an interpretation of how each rm adjusts its decision in the face of the other rm's choice. The se-quences, f k ; k g and fu k ; p k g, describe a process of adjustment to equilibrium.
Price-based adaptive SRR
In a deregulated electricity market like the one proposed in California, spinning reserve is obtained and priced as an ancillary service. The ISO has ultimate responsibility for meeting the reserve requirements based on predetermined operating guidelines. Scheduling coordinators have the option to provide some or all of their reserve requirements. If they do not self-provide, the ISO will do so at the spot price. A coordinator thus faces the problems of estimating the value or opportunity cost of reserves, and then of deciding on its levels of self-provision of reserves, and whether to bid into the reserve auction, based on this value. In this paper, we propose a scheme for obtaining an optimal level of spinning reserves at or above a minimum requirement, on the assumption that additional reserves have v alue in at least some hours. The exible SRR avoids uneconomic solutions in which expensive units are unnecessarily committed, and also avoids cases in which requiring desired higher levels of reserves would result in the program not nding a feasible unit commitment. These phenomena both tend to be indicated by high values of the multipliers on spinning reserves. A exible SRR which is formulated as a function of an iteratively determined value of reserves can therefore also be used to improve tradeo s between optimality and feasibility in the unit commitment solution.
We n o w modify the two-rm model de ned in Section 3.1. Let rm P now also select its SRR. Firm Q, as in the original model o ers prices and . After observing the prices and , rm P de nes its SRR rst, then solves the corresponding optimal generating policy, fu it ; p it g for all i; t. We assume that R t is selected based on a function of t in the form t D t , where : + ! a t ; b t is a monotone nonincreasing function. For simplicity, w e denote it as R t t . R t is called the response function of rm P. This means that when t , the price of spinning capacity o ered by Q , i s high, rm P not only tends to commit more units as in the original model but also wants to lower its SRR, and vice versa. An example of R t t is depicted in Figure   2 , where R t t = b t + a t =2 + b t , a t =2 tanh, t , D t , 0, 0.
In this extended two-rm model, the SRR is driven by price through a response function. This corresponds to a variation of the dual problem D. We will present the formulation along with the solution procedure in the following section. 4 The solution procedure
Despite the e ciency of solving D due to its separability, the solution of D d o e s not necessarily yield a feasible solution to P, i.e. satisfying 2 and 3. Lagrangian relaxation algorithms for solving unit commitment h a ve often been implemented with two phases: a dual optimization phase and a feasibility phase. In 13 , a three-phase structure of algorithm for solving unit commitment problem is proposed as follows. Phase 1: Dual optimization, i.e., solving D. Phase 2: Feasibility phase: to obtain a feasible schedule. Phase 3: Unit decommitment phase.
In the following sections, we will rst brie y review the three-phase algorithm for solving the unit commitment with xed SRR. With little modi cation, the threephase algorithm is extended to handle the case with exible SRR.
Three-phase algorithm with xed SRR
It is well known that the dual objective function d is concave and continuous but not necessarily di erentiable at all points. A subgradient algorithm is applied to solve the dual problem D. It can be shown that the vector of the mismatches in the demand constraints and the spinning reserve constraints is a subgradient of the dual objective function d 1 .
Phase 1: The subgradient algorithm
Step 0: k 0; 0 and 0 are given.
Step 1: If stopping criteria are met, stop. Otherwise solve d k ; k ; R to obtain u k ; p k .
Step 2: k+1 t = k t + s k D t , P I i=1 p k it u k it , k+1 t = max0; k t + s k R t , P I i=1 r i p it u k it ; 8t: Step 3: k k + 1, go to Step 1. In 8 , it is shown that under some conditions on the step size s k , the subgradient algorithm converges. The stopping criteria used in our implementation include the maximum number of iterations, the change of norm of subgradients at two consecutive iterations and the number of iterations without improvement in the dual objective value.
In the Phase 2 proposed in 15 , the hour of the most-violated SRR is determined, and the corresponding t is enhanced. A method is proposed to calculate the exact amount of the increase in the value of the corresponding t to make SRR satis ed at the corresponding hour. However, this method seems to take a long time for locating a feasible solution because only one t is updated at a time. A natural extension is to simultaneously update at each iteration the t corresponding to all the hours that the SRR is violated 4, 13 . This speeds up the feasibility phase at a cost of possible overcommitment in the generating units 13 . Under the structure of the three-phase algorithm, this overcommitment can be corrected in the unit decommitment phase to be discussed later. Although these Phase 2 methods were all designed for the case where spinning capacity constraints of the form below:
p max i u it D t + R t ; 8t; 10 the basic idea behind them can actually be applied to the reserve constraints of the form in 3.
The purpose of a Phase 2 algorithm is to obtain a feasible solution, or equivalently, a dispatchable commitment. We rst examine the conditions of existence of a dispatchable commitment. Given a commitment fũ it g, it is dispatchable if and only if the following conditions hold for 8t. The proof of the existence conditions above is straightforward and is omitted here. It can be seen that the existence of a solution requires the satisfaction of su ciency of both system spinning capability, 11a and 11b, and reserve capability 11c. We n o w i n troduce our Phase 2 algorithm.
Phase 2: Feasibility algorithm
Step 0: k 0; 0 and 0 are from Phase 1.
Step 1: Given k and k , solve d k ; k ; R to obtain u k ; p k .
Step 2: If the existence conditions 11a to 11c, applied to fu k it g, are satis ed, stop and fu k it g is dispatchable.
Step 3: k+1 t = k t , k+1 t = k t + s k k t , k t 0 for 8t violating the existence conditions 11a to 11c, applied to fu k it g.
Step 4: k k + 1, go to Step 1.
In
Step 2 of the algorithm above, for the hours with insu cient system spinning or reserve capability, the corresponding t are enhanced by k t . This, based on our two-rm interpretation, will induce more unit commitment.
A unit decommitment method has been developed as a post-processing phase Phase 3 for the algorithms for solving the unit commitment problem. Given a feasible unit commitment u;p, the unit decommitment method improves the solution while maintaining feasibility. In 12 i t i s s h o wn that the unit decommitment method not only improves solution quality generally, but also mitigates unpredictable e ects due to heuristics in the rst two phases. The interested reader can refer to 12, 1 3 for detailed discussion.
Three-phase algorithm with adaptive SRR
In Section 3.2, the concept of price-based adaptive SRR is introduced. This exible SRR of rm P is captured by a response function R t at time t. Depending on whether rm Q knows the response function of rm P, rm Q's decision for price adjustment v aries. This creates two v ariations of the dual problem D, Nash-type and Stackelberg-type two-rm models, to be discussed next.
Sequential bargaining game model
Consider a sequential bargaining game of complete and perfect information in which r m Q m o ves rst and rm P moves second. The timing of the game is as follows: 1 rm Q chooses the prices t and t , for all t; 2 rm P observes t and t , and then chooses its SRR and the corresponding optimal generating policy, u it and p it . Assume the scenario is common knowledge to both rms P and Q, but rm Q does not know the response function of rm P. In the sequel, we use the notation R = R 1 1 ; ; R T T .
Proposition 2 If ; ; u ; p is a solution to the following problem D , then ; ; R ; u ; p is a Nash equilibrium of the sequential bargaining game. P I i=1 C i p it u it + S i x i;t,1 ; u it ; u i;t,1 + P T t=1 t D t , P I i=1 p it u it + t R t , P I i=1 r i p it u it subject to R t = R t t :
To nd a Nash equilibrium, we construct an algorithm to simulate the process of adjustment t o ward equilibrium. At each iteration, as in the subgradient algorithm, rm Q adjusts prices based on the law of supply and rm P minimizes its cost. Also rm P updates its SRR in response to rm Q's price, i.e. R k+1 t = R t k t . This means that in order to achieve R t = R t t rm P approximates t by k t .
Nash-type Phase 1 Algorithm
Step 0: k 0; f 0 t g and f 0 t g are given.
Step 1: Given k , k , solve d k ; k ; R k to obtain u k ; p k .
Step 2: k+1 t = k t + s k D t , P I i=1 p k it u k it , k+1 t = max0; k t + s k R t , P I i=1 r i p k it u k it ; 8t:
Step 3: k k + 1, go to Step 1.
The convergence of Nash Algorithm has not yet been established theoretically, but it converges in all observed cases.
Stackelberg game
As in the sequential bargaining game de ned in Section 4.2 we n o w consider the case that rm Q knows the response function of rm P so that rm Q expects rm P's response in its revenue maximization problem. This game is commonly known as a Stackelberg game 5 . P I i=1 C i p it u it + S i x i;t,1 ; u it ; u i;t,1 + P T t=1 t D t , P I i=1 p it u it + t R t t , P I i=1 r i p it u it : 1 A 13
We assume that R t is continuously di erentiable for all t. W e can then apply the subgradient algorithm to solve D to obtain a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Stackelberg-type Phase 1 Algorithm
Step 1: Given k and k , solve d k ; k ; R k to obtain u k ; p k , for 8i; t.
Step 2: k+1 t = k t + s k D t , P I i=1 p k it u k it , k+1 t = max0; k t + s k R t k t , P I i=1 r i p k it u k it + k t R 0 t k t ; 8t:
Note that the objective o f D is not necessarily concave because P T t=1 t R 0 t t m a y not be concave.
The feasibility algorithm for the case with exible SRR is basically the same as the Phase 2 algorithm presented in Section 4.1 with the xed SRR R t replaced by the exible one R t , as a function of appropriate t . F or simplicity, w e will not restate the Phase 2 algorithm here. After Phase 2, a feasible schedule corresponding to a SRR will be obtained. The SRR determined from the nal iteration of Phase 2 can therefore be regarded as the system SRR. A unit decommitment method can then be applied to improve the solution quality with this system SRR xed.
Discussion
Let L be the Lagrangian of the unit commitment problem P: Without really solving D, we approximate the duality gap between P and D b y the`duality' gap between P and D: Note that this approximation is more restrictive with a larger value than the value of the actual duality gap. In our experiments, the`duality' gap between D and P is within 1:5 for 10-unit-168-hour cases, and within 0:3 for 30-unit-168-hour cases. The real duality gaps between P and D for both cases are actually smaller.
Numerical results
The algorithms are implemented in FORTRAN on an HP 700 workstation. A 30-unit thermal model problem over a one week planning horizon is tested. The total system capacity is 15,515 MW which i s m uch higher than the peak load. We apply the three-phase algorithm to solve the unit commitment problem. In this test problem, we let the interval of SSR a t D t ; b t D t b e 0 :05D t ; 0:07D t , for all t. The conventional xed SRR method R t = 0 :07D t , for all t is compared with the adaptive SRR method. We also have tested both Nash and Stackelberg Algorithms in the Phase 1 in the adaptive SRR case. The response function used in this test problem has the form: R t t = 0 :06 + 0:01 tanh,4 t , 0:5; 8t:
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The algorithm performances are summarized in Table 1 .
Both adaptive SRR algorithms have l o wer total generating cost due to the relaxation of SRR, and achieve better solutions in terms of the duality gap. Also the Stackelberg model outperforms the sequential bargaining model Nash Algorithm in terms of cost saving because of having more information as explained in Section 4.
The system spinning capacity pro les obtained by xed SRR and adaptive SRR Stackelberg model methods are depicted in Figure 3 , in which only one day i s s h o wn. The corresponding data can be found in Tables 2 and 3. In  Table 2 the multipliers t corresponding to xed 7 SRR in selected hours are listed. The value of t in an hour re ects the shadow price of the SRR in the hour. Note that the value of in hour 12 is much higher than those of t in other hours. In Table 3 , the proposed adaptive SRR is applied to the same test problem. It can be seen that the SRR in an hour responds to the corresponding t based on the response function 21. In Figure 3 it can be seen at hour 12, the SRR has been relaxed down to 5 of the load and yields an actual reserve of 5.8 of the load. Slight relaxation of the SRR at hour 12 a ects the commitment in the following hours due to minimum uptime or down time constraints. In Figure 3 it can be seen that during the period between hours 15 and 19, a commitment with adequate but more economic spinning reserve i s a c hieved with adaptive SRR. At the same time higher spinning reserve which increases reliability is maintained when it is inexpensive.
Conclusion
In this paper we h a ve i n terpreted the Lagrangian relaxation method for solving the unit commitment a s a t wo-player game: one player chooses unit commitment to minimize cost based on prices; the other adjusts prices to maximize revenue. The optimum solution of the Lagrangian relaxation method is shown to be a Nash equilibrium of this game. We h a ve also shown that the sub- gradient rule captures the responses of the players. Along this interpretation, the game model can include other system parameters as decision variables to the game. For example,`soft' spinning reserve requirements are made adaptive and respond to a price signal according to a nonincreasing response function at each iteration in the dual optimization. The numerical test results show that this method avoids uneconomic unit commitment solutions while enhancing system security. This approach can yield both cost savings and improved algorithm performance. In the context of deregulation, we believe that scheduling coordinators such as the Power Exchange who have the option of self-providing spinning reserves will nd an adaptive representation of their reserve requirements to be the appropriate one in nding their most pro table reserve levels. 
